on recurring cultural structures. Bourdieu's (1977; 1990) "habitus", "an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted" continues this theme. According to Bourdieu, schemes are founded in learning during the early years of life, are habitual and unreflective, and are adjusted to the objective conditions of existence. Once acquired habitus underlies and conditions all subsequent learning and social experience.
These, and related formulations, of cultural structures have been criticized for their tendency to determinism (Fox 1985) . Ortner (1990) has attempted to respond to these criticisms, returning choice, agency and intentionality to actors while reaffirming cultural and symbolically ordered causality. Her conception posits schemas as a middle ground between structure and agency, one requiring: "a certain distance … between actors and their cultural repertoire (Ortner 1990: 92) ." In his related attempt to bridge structure and agency, Shore (1996) distinguishes abstract and wide ranging models, or foundational schemas, from their concrete and specific instantiations, reserving the term models for the latter. Foundational schemas are grounded in experience and learning, shared and instituted. In their public form, they often take on symbolic attributes. Foundational schemas as well as their instantiations can also exist as mental constructs; yet, unlike public and instituted schemas and models, the cognitive properties of mental constructs are relatively inaccessible.
Property rights institutions illustrate well the play of culture and symbolic causality with choice, agency and intentionality; they also lend themselves to culturallylearning embodied in individuals, groups, and societies that is cumulative through time and passed on intergenerationally by the culture of a society (North 1994: 360-363) ." side of the river juts up against the western edge of a high plateau, the Leonese páramo, as much as 160 meters above. Until this century, farmers cultivated these flat uplands extensively, relying on rainfall for moisture and fallowing to regain fertility.
Around the turn of the 20 th century, several forces converged to transform the agriculture of the Orbigo ribera and páramo. A new ideology of economic development coursed through Spain promoting the expansion of irrigation as a solution to the country's economic crisis. In León, followers of a progressive educational ideology, the Institución Libre de Enseñanza, put these ideas to work by founding an agricultural school in the town of Hospital de Orbigo. The school's experiments with crops, nitrate fertilizers, and agricultural implements, such as the Brabant plow, created a climate favorable to agrarian change (Canton Mayo 1995) .
The most important of these forces was the introduction of sugar beets. While Leonese farmers had cultivated sugar beets successfully as early as the 1880's, the crop failed to gain a foothold because Cuban sugar cane plantations supplied the Spanish internal market for sugar. When Spain's loss of Cuba to the United States in the Spanish-American war in 1898 removed the island as a source of sugar for domestic consumption, Spanish entrepreneurs quickly moved into the breach. A sugar beet processing factory was installed in Veguellina in the Orbigo ribera in [1899] [1900] and offered lucrative contractual terms to farmers for the cultivation and delivery of sugar beets (Marrón Gaite 1992, Table 18 p. 75-76) . Returns from sugar beet production were much higher than existing crops. Farmers in the riberas and uplands of the Orbigo, Bernesga and Esla rivers quickly took up its cultivation (Marrón Gaite 1992, Table 13 ,14 pp. 56-57). There it excelled, producing sugar content significantly higher than the national average (Ministerio de Agricultura 1973: 92) .
The adoption of sugar beets caused profound agrarian, economic and social changes in the region. Those associated with irrigation were the most notable (Jimenez Blanco 1986: 54) . Sugar beets need constant moisture and in the Orbigo ribera and páramo at least five separate irrigations are necessary for adequate development (Alonso-Munoyerro 1986:62; Teijon Laso 1949:260) . While ribera farmers had access to water from the Orbigo river for irrigation, from July to early September upstream rainfall declined precipitously and river water dried up (Ministerio de Agricultura 1973   Table 18 , p. 85). A secure source of moisture during this period was crucial for adequate levels of sugar.
The solution lie in ground water irrigation. Spain was certainly no stranger to groundwater irrigation and Muslims left behind a wide range of lift technologies (Glick 1996) . In the riberas and vegas of northwestern Spain, however, ample surface water kept rich networks of acquifers and groundwater basins from being tapped until this century. The earliest experiments with groundwater irrigation involved buckets attached to simple counterweighted shafts mounted, in turn, on tripods. While relatively inexpensive, these hand operated cigüeñales were limited in capacity. At best they were capable of lifting water from depths of 3 to 4 meters to irrigate no more than about .17 hectares of land or a small kitchen garden (Llauradó 1878: 254-255; Junta Consultiva Agronómica 1918 Table   D p. 62). The fabrication of a light noria better adapted to the soils and water levels of the ribera and páramo than the heavy ones from the south and east facilitated the process. The Ministry of Agriculture contributed by founding a sperm bank in the ribera to breed specialized horses to drive norias and agricultural implements (Ministerio de Agricultura 1973:97) . The efforts proved successful, demonstrating an enormous network of easily accessible acquifers.
Once páramo farmers saw the success of cigüeñales and norias in the ribera, they began to experiment with them in their own fields. Initially, they installed norias in strips of land in the ribera controlled by páramo villages. This land was already irrigated by surface water and, as elsewhere in the ribera, groundwater supplemented low river water during the summer drought. The success of norias in these ribera outposts inspired landowners to try out norias on the páramo proper (Rubio Recio 1959: 34) . Soon noria-equipped wells brought irrigation throughout the growing season to páramo agriculture. Expansion of ground water irrigation in the páramo was rapid and dramatic. Nine thousand norias were installed during the period 1920-30 (Delegación de los Servicios Hidráulicas 1935: 2).
The pace of groundwater extraction depleted the most accessible acquifers in the 1930's and some farmers were forced to replace norias with mechanical pumps driven by electricity and gasoline (Junta Consultiva Agronómica 1918:49-50; Rubio Recio 1955:43-45; Sánchez Lopez 1986) . By 1942, ground water irrigation had brought more than 10,000 has. of vineyards in the páramo abandoned during the phylloxera epidemic of the turn of the century into intensive production (Fernández Urquiza 1942) . When the Barrios de Luna dam upstream of the Orbigo river came on line in the 1950's, ground water irrigation in the ribera and páramo abruptly halted. By accumulating water during the winter and releasing it slowly during the agricultural season, the dam solved the seasonal problem of drought plaguing ribera communities and the permanent problem of insufficient moisture for páramo agriculture.
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GROUND WATER
At the peak of groundwater irrigation during the 1940's, an agrarian engineer, Juan Fernández Urquiza, and a cultural geographer, Evelio Teijón Laso, found two property rights systems at work in the Orbigo (Fernández Urquiza 1942; Teijón Laso 1949) . In one, ribera farmers held wells and norias in small groups and shared rights to water. In the other, páramo farmers kept wells and norias as private property and used groundwater to irrigate one's own fields. In explaining this divergence, the two observers pointed to larger field sizes in the páramo than in the ribera. Their assertion of a difference in field size were accurate. While farmers in both zones held large portfolios of fields to reduce risk, páramo fields were significantly larger (1.98 has.) on the average than those of the ribera (0.11 has.).
2 In attributing the differences in property regimes to divergences in field size, the two authors implicitly applied an explanatory model of costs and benefits. Older farmers today who remember the period use similar language when asked to explicate the divergence in property rights. They explain that private property is always preferred and made economic sense with the large field sizes in the páramo.
On the cost side, ribera wells were more costly to install (Table 1) . Ribera wells supplied much more water and required larger norias than in the Páramo, increasing capital outlays. In later years, as water levels fell in the páramo, the costs of installing a noria-equipped well there began to exceed those of the ribera. Falling water levels increased excavation costs, the size of the norias and the number of buckets, and the strength of the draft animals. Costly design features, such as enlarged bottoms, galerías, and subsurface networks of pipes, were necessary to maximize the capture and distribution of scarce water. Right-of-way costs to irrigate one's field, on the other hand, were non-existent. The parallel exercise for installing a noria in a typically small field in the ribera would hardly seem to justify the effort. Virtually all ribera fields already possessed rights to surface water and, indeed, cereal yields were quite high. The real contribution of groundwater irrigation was to ensure sufficient water for irrigating ribera fields during the summer drought months of July and August, when field crops flowered and moisture was essential. 4 Groundwater complemented scarce surface water at this time and helped insure against crop failure. While the role of groundwater irrigation as crop insurance was not trivial, returns to capital paled in comparison with the dramatic increases in yields and value of rainfed land converted to irrigated land. In neoclassical economic theory, then, converting the typical ribera field to groundwater irrigation would be irrational. High capital costs would not be rewarded with commensurate returns.
There were exceptions in the ribera and some landowners found the costs and benefits of installing a well and equipping it with a noria tilted in their favor. In certain locations, some fields were simply too high for surface water to reach. Groundwater lifted to the surface of the field was the only possible source of water for irrigation. In these cases, groundwater irrigation brought increases in yields and land value paralleling the páramo.
Wealthy landowners were another exception. Ready access to liquid capital enabled one to meet the substantial start-up costs. This put early adopters of groundwater irrigation systems in an advantageous position to sell water. One could amortize capital outlays, meet operating costs and eventually realize a profit in this way. Even the owner of a small field could justify a groundwater installation from water sales alone. Over time, the strategy could backfire as adjacent landowners installed their own wells, reducing the demand for purchased water. But the strategy could be used in later years and in locations where water levels declined to such an extent that only very expensive electric and diesel pumps could lift water. Once again, wellfinanced entrepreneurs could replace their norias with pumps and sell water at profitable rates.
In Spain at the time, virtually non-existent transaction costs attended the 4 Beans, hops, maize and potatoes flower during July and August. Sugar beets are extremely sensitive to periods of lack of moisture throughout their growing cycle. See: Ministerio de Agricultura 1973 In sum, the calculation of the cost and benefits of installing groundwater irrigation on large, rainfed, fields in the páramo, and for a handful of wealthy landowners and owners of rainfed fields in the ribera, made economic sense, particularly in this unusual period of zero transaction costs. Why would anyone install a well and noria in a field in the ribera already equipped with surface water for irrigation?
Unless one were a wealthy landowner during a period when water sales could bring returns to capital, it would have been simply irrational to go to the expense of installing groundwater irrigation. Yet, ribera farmers formed common property arrangements to acquire groundwater irrigation, a path plagued with potential free rider and rent dissipation problems. What were the economic calculations behind their adoption?
Noria Partnerships
Throughout the ribera, small groups of adjacent landowners joined together to pool labor and capital to dig a well and install a noria. The well, the noria and the rights to the lifted water were held by the groups of shareholders, or socios, as a partnership or sociedad. 12 Water was allotted to share holders in a variety of ways. In the case of an unusually well-endowed well and few shareholders, one could obtain water on a By far, the most frequent mode of allocation was to divide up the 24 hour day into timeshares of water, called suertes or partes. In some partnerships, a base share was 6 hours and original shareholders could amass multiples of 6, 12, 18 and 24 hour shares. In others, shares were held in 24 hour units with a total of seven shares and seven shareholders. 14 In these case, shares were subdivided into two turns of 12
hours, considered about the maximum length of time a horse could operate a noria.
Since farmers usually irrigated for at least 6 hours but no more than 12 hours during a 24 hour period, initial shares of 24 hours could be further subdivided into up to 4 parts. 15 Shares were taken in rotation and a night time share was considered less valuable than one falling in the day. To account for the difference in value between nighttime and daytime shares, a new sequence was established by a lottery at the 12 Partnerships were never established for a well equipped with a cigüeñal, electric, gasoline, or diesel driven pump. 13 A well was not noted as an improvement in the ribera since fields were already irrigated with surface water. 14 If a noria society had less than 7 members, the remaining shares were divided up equally among the shareholders.. 15 No one seems to have had a partial share of less than 6 hours.
beginning of each irrigation season.
Original shareholders often had shares with more time than they needed. With a 24 hour share, one often ended up with 12 to 18 hours of excess time. Unusually wet years or the cultivation of a crop needing little water also produced a surplus. Excess time could be disposed of in several ways. One was to simply give it away with no immediate expectation of return. More commonly, partial and occasionally full shares were traded with shareholders elsewhere to obtain access to the water necessary to irrigate a distant field. Widespread water share trading enabled many more fields then those within the service area of a well to be irrigated. It was a major advantage for most farmers who held a portfolio of fields in various locations.
Another possibility was to sell water. A full or partial share could be sold to another and recorded in an informal contract or escritura privada. Non-members buying into a partnership were required to join and agree to all of its obligations. 16 This rule also applied to the acquisition of shares through exchange. Sale and exchange of shares increased the number of shareholders considerably in a partnership. Temporary sales during the irrigation season were not uncommon. Charges were calculated on the basis of time, irrigated area and, occasionally, a field plowing. Contracts were informal and could extend for one day or the entire season. In Matilla de la Vega, for example, in 1940, 1 peseta was charged to irrigate one emina. 17 The spot market for the sale of water conveyed over the surface to distant landowners was "thin," however, since difficulties in transport restricted the number of landowners who could benefit. For this 16 The sale during 1940-50 in Villares of a 12 hour share of water every 8 days went for 3,000 pesetas. 17 One emina = 626 meters of area.
reason, sales to landowners much beyond the original service area of a well were uncommon. Presa canals were not always available nor positioned correctly to convey groundwater to a distant field. As a result, prices were negotiated on a case by case basis, depending on the position of one's field with respect to the well and the difficulties of conveying the water. Exchanges of shares between the owners of distant fields were far more likely. Shareholders are obligated to provide right of way, pay fines for damages and contribute (on a prorated basis depending on their shares) to any legal costs that arise from defense of the property rights of the noria society.
In sum, farmers entered into noria partnerships to meet the start-up costs of labor and capital and to share the operational costs during the year. Most wells in the ribera had sufficient capacity to provide water 24 hours a day. Three farmers could reasonably expect to irrigate their fields each day and more if one were willing to irrigate at night. Time shares reflected a standard period of irrigation. Water sales and exchanges allowed one to fully or partially convert one's share to monetary capital, either temporarily or permanently, or to trade it for another close to a distant field. In this way, access to groundwater could be adjusted to maintain factor proportionality.
Political, economic and environmental factors illuminate, then, the rationality behind the emergence of private property rights for groundwater and norias in the páramo and a small set of cases in the ribera. They also explain the importance of the pooling of capital and labor in the omnipresent noria partnerships in the ribera. Yet, why would farmers arrange to hold groundwater and norias under less than full property rights, given the notoriety of freeriding and rent dissipation endemic to common property?
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SCHEMAS IN PROPERTY RIGHTS INNOVATION: A FOUNDATION SCHEMA
Ribera farmers were not operating in an historical vacuum and had available to them a wide range of private and common property arrangements refined over time through trial and error. Their "conventional wisdom" about property rights included cultural knowledge structured as a framework for understanding previous cases and suggesting solutions for new ones. To reconstruct their "conventional wisdom" at the time of the groundwater revolution one must know the range of property rights available at the time, the specific uses to which they had been put, and their possible applications. Concepts of foundational schemas, cases, special purpose models and mental models may be useful in the process. Experiences in structuring rights to collectively-managed public goods gave rise to an abstract proposition-schema useful for application to a specific type of good.
Goods to which it was applied were costly, beyond those affordable by an ordinary individual. A group could then pool capital and labor to meet the start-up and maintenance costs. The good also had to be divisible into units of time. The amount of labor and capital one contributed to the start-up costs could then be used to calculate on a proportionate base one's entitlement to a time share. Time shares were taken in rotation. The schema has its origins in the 10 th century and over time became To share the start-up capital costs and annual maintenance of a system of dam and canals, two or more villages joined together into an irrigation association, or presa.
This provided a partial solution, however: a way had to be found to exclude access to the water lest farmers who did not contribute to the costs divert it for their own use, a classic free-riding problem. Moreover, upstream users had the potential to take water first, leaving none for downstream users, a frequent problem in canal irrigation. The solution was for presas to assign rights to individuals or groups to use presa water.
One possibility was for presas to allocate exclusive rights to water directly to President is named following the sequence in a list of vecinos. This is a task one can't refuse. The President keeps the key to the mill and attends to its maintenance. The lists were renovated in recent years but the mill has been operated in virtually the same way since the Middle Ages.
Noria partnerships represent, then, a third application of the schema. In this instance, a small group of farmers contribute capital and labor (and one member a parcel of land on which to excavate the well) to excavating the well and acquiring the noria and allocate time shares based on units of a twenty four hour day and calculated according to one's contribution. Costs of maintaining the noria and well are also calculated this way. Once established, transfer of shares within the group is usually permitted. Transfer to one outside of the group may raise problems and for this reason shares are often restricted to members or one willing to assume membership and acceptable as a member.
In each of these cases, multistranded ties of occupation, kinship, friendship, and residence overlapped the contractual interests of holders of rights to surface water, water mills, and ground water. These ties helped governance systems lower transaction costs by drawing on trust to manage the tendency toward freeriding and rent dissipation inherent in common property. Trust has been found basic to the lower transaction costs of systems of self-governance in comparison with state based, hierarchical and bureaucratic systems (Tang 1992; Landa 1994) .
20 "The organization of the use (of the mills) has antecedents in the ancient system of the vices or turns practiced since the 10 th century, which over time became incorporated into customary law (1993:18, my translation Alonso-Gonzalez 1993: 18); see also, Vassberg 1984: 56; Sanchez-Albornoz 1980 : 1464 .
THE RETURN TO GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION: "DEAD MODELS"
Cultural models do not automatically transfer from generation to generation.
Members of new generations may fail to internalize a cultural model because their experiences do not correspond to conventional models. Failing to internalize a cultural model, these individuals may fall back on mental models that are highly idiosyncratic or manifest socially as marginal or innovative. Thus while past experience may accumulate and be culled and reduced into a set of foundation schemas, there is no guarantee that they will continue indefinitely to structure or motivate action. Unless they continue to connect with experience they may well become what Shore (1992: 52) calls "dead" models. It is conceivable that the high capital costs of these water lifting technologies could be met by arrangements similar to the noria partnerships so prevalent in the ribera until the 1950's. But, partnerships do not occur as "models of the appropriate" to farmers under 40 years of age with no direct, personal, experience of noria partnerships. An entire generation without the experience necessary to reinscribe a foundational schema has caused its eventual demise (Shore 1996: 47) . The generation over 40, the last with direct experience of noria partnerships, on the other hand berates the lack of trust and willingness to assume responsibility, essential to the success of the partnerships. Partnerships to hold groundwater and water lifting devices in groups are a dead issue with them not so much because it hasn't occurred to them but because they see the costs of freeriding looming large in an increasing individualistic society.
CONCLUSION
In the initial "search" stage of property rights innovation, actors are faced with a virtually infinite range of possible institutional arrangements. This range must somehow be reduced in complexity to enable action. A number of processes have been described by cognitive scientists to solve these problems.
22 Human problem-solving techniques must be grounded in cultural knowledge, however, for them to be "appropriate." Cultural knowledge is acquired through trial-and-error and learned from others, largely through talk.
In northwestern Spain, generations of farmers have amassed close to a thousand years of collective experience with private (cultivable land, houseplots) and open-and restricted-access common property (forests, threshing grounds, irrigation associations, pastures, water mills). This rich body of experience has been culled and reduced to a set of foundational schemas of property rights. Implicit and taken-forgranted, these schemas are drawn on in explaining past experiences with property 22 These processes include "scripts," preattentive plans analogous to scripts in plays that tell actors what to do (Schank 1982) "heuristics", rules-of-thumb, used by individuals to assess the probabilities of the outcome of courses of action (Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1974) , case-based reasoning, the making of inferences based on concrete experiences (Kolodner 1994) and, "mindless," passive, decisionmaking, the mechanical selection of options on the bases of cognitive commitment (Langer 1994).
rights and in structuring new property rights arrangements.
The restricted-access common property foundation schema discussed here has historically been applied to irrigation systems, water mills, and noria-equipped wells held as. These resources shared two characteristics. Their start-up costs of capital and labor were very high, far beyond what an individual could afford. Holland (1992) calls, "messy" situations and "sites of censorship". In these situations external forces come into play. As Ortner puts it, "whether (schemas acquire potential structuring force) depends on a multitude of real-world factors (the actor's money, luck, social clout, the degree to which the other parties can be enlisted to play their parts, and so forth (1990: 92) ." Illuminating the systematic interaction of schemas and external forces in a given domain, then, can contribute to understanding institutional change.
In the domain of property rights, NIE offers powerful tools for gaining insight into those external factors which regularly enter into the evaluation of alternative institutional schemas. Property rights schemas crystallize cultural knowledge of the costs of capturing, transferring and protecting the rights assigned to specific resources in state, private and common property and solutions to managing these costs. For example, actors assess the advantages of pooling capital and labor in common property arrangements against the potential costs of freeriding and rent dissipation and weigh the results against a similar calculation for private property. Successful past adjustments to institutional arrangement are also embedded in property rights schemas. A key variable influencing the efficiency and potential for freeriding in common property is the size and structure of the group holding the resource (Ostrom 1990 ). The size and structure of these groups did indeed vary in the three cases from federations of villages and towns (canal irrigation systems), to individual villages (water mills), to small groups of adjoining landowners (noria-equipped wells). In each case, the structure was adjusted where necessary to kept groups small enough to draw on the trust adhering in existing face to face relationships. The canal irrigation associations, for example, contracted with municipalities, who, in turn, contracted for delivery of water to end-users. This arrangement minimized transaction costs to presas by radically limiting the number of contracts to a handful of founding municipalities and passing on to them the costs of contracting with end-users. A rather simple foundational schema of restricted access common property interacted with a host of external factors to structure a wide range of cultural models with a long and successful history of serving their ends. Unless a schema is reinscribed in each generation in the minds of its members it may well lose their motivational force. A new generation without direct experience can break the chain of transmission. Reactivating the schema, then, becomes a curious idiosyncrasy for some or a risky innovation for others. 
